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C O N T E N TS
FEDERAL REGULATION OF 
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
A Statutory arid Structural Overview
This  b o o k  is a pr a ctica l  g u id e  to labor law in the private sector. The first8 chapters present a discussion of legal principles primarily based on the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA), 1947, as amended, commonly referred to as 
the “Act.” The remaining chapters discuss principles based on the Labor Manage­
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
as well as on the LMRA.1
This chapter begins with a brief historical survey of federal labor legislation 
leading to the passage of the LMRA in the current form studied in this book. 
This survey is followed by an introductory overview of the major provisions of the 
LMRA, which are considered in detail in subsequent chapters, and by an expla­
nation of the structure and procedures of the National Labor Relations Board, the 
agency administering the Act.
PART I: The Historical Development of 
the Labor Management Relations Act
A. Collective Bargaining 
before the Statutory Era
Before the passage of the federal labor legisla­
tion discussed in this book, regulation of labor 
relations was left largely to the states. The law 
governing labor relations was primarily devel­
oped by state courts on a case-by-case basis. This 
process of judicial development is known as 
the “common law,” in contrast to statutory law 
(laws made by the legislature) or administrative 
law (laws made by administrative agencies).
1 The complete text of a statute discussed in this chap­
ter may be reviewed on the website of the agency enforcing 
that law. Please consult the Guide to Basic Research Re­
sources in the front part of this book.
Workers began to organize into workers’ 
associations, the historical forerunner of to­
day’s unions, in America in the late 1700s. The 
concept of workers uniting together to improve 
their working conditions was initially greeted 
by hostility in the courts. Thus, in the histori­
cally important Philadelphia Cordwainers case, 
decided in 1806, the court ruled that it was an 
unlawful conspiracy for workers to form an 
organization in which the membership agreed 
that none of them would work as shoemakers 
except at certain specified prices higher than the 
price that had previously been paid. The doc­
trine that an organization of workers formed to 
better their working conditions constituted an 
unlawful conspiracy was frequently followed in 
the United States until the mid-1850s. However, 
in 1842, the Massachusetts Supreme Court is­
sued an important decision upholding the right 
of workers to form associations, and this view­
point gradually was adopted in other states.
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Although the state courts began to recog­
nize the rights of workers to form labor or­
ganizations, the courts continued to restrict 
the methods that unions could use to accom­
plish their goals as the labor movement grew 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Some courts distinguished between the right 
to strike and the right to picket. These courts 
upheld the right of workers to withhold their 
own services in order to force a change in their 
working conditions. But such courts, reason­
ing that an employer had the right to continue 
operations during a strike and that employees 
(those who chose to) had the right to continue 
working, frequently issued injunctions prohib­
iting unions from picketing in support of their 
strike on the theory that even peaceful pick­
eting coerced and interfered with the rights 
of the employer to continue operation and of 
employees to continue working. Obviously, this 
approach seriously undermined the effective­
ness of strike activity. Even those state courts 
that upheld the right of workers to strike and 
to picket under some circumstances frequently 
issued injunctions limiting the scope of union 
conduct if the judge did not approve of the 
conduct or the purpose of the strike. This was 
known as the ends/means test. Thus, in some 
states, picketing in support of a union’s claim 
to certain work in a jurisdictional dispute was 
held to be for an unlawful purpose (end), and 
the state court would enjoin the picketing. 
Product boycotts in support of a strike were 
sometimes enjoined as being an unlawful 
method.
The American economy in the second 
half of the nineteenth century and early in the 
twentieth century was philosophically based on 
the concept of open competition, unfettered by 
governmental restrictions, commonly referred 
to as laissez-faire (French words meaning “to 
do as one pleases”) government. The conserva­
tive pro-business courts of the period applied 
this philosophy in determining the lawfulness 
of union conduct. For example, strikes protest­
ing an employer’s unilateral change in produc­
tion methods, resulting in a loss of jobs for the 
affected employees, were enjoined by the courts 
on the grounds that such strikes were for the
unlawful purpose of interfering with the em­
ployer’s right to determine the manner of pro­
duction. In many states, collective bargaining 
agreements, once entered into, were valid and 
binding. However, an employer was under no 
obligation to engage in collective bargaining 
or to sign a collective bargaining agreement. 
Thus, in such states, a court would enjoin a 
strike to compel an employer to sign a collec­
tive bargaining agreement, on the grounds that 
such a strike was for the unlawful purpose of 
interfering with the employer’s right to enter or 
not enter into such an agreement on a voluntary 
basis.
O f course, the rights of employees and labor 
unions during this prestatutory era varied ac­
cording to the social and political climate of 
the state. Labor unions engaged in a broader 
range of permissible conduct in those states 
where judges were more progressive, or where 
the labor movement had greater political 
strength. In every state, however, the probusiness 
legal doctrines applied in determining the legal­
ity of union conduct and the broad discretion 
that individual judges had under the common 
law in applying these doctrines placed unions 
under restraints varying from court to court and 
from case to case, with many resultant incon­
sistencies between decisions and principles that 
they applied.
The federal courts also interfered in the or­
ganization and conduct of labor unions. With 
the passage of the federal Sherman Antitrust 
Act in 1890 (see chapter 8, part IV), the federal 
courts frequently issued injunctions against 
union strike activity or boycotts of employers 
involved in a labor dispute on the grounds that 
such union conduct interfered with the free flow 
of goods in commerce and was thus a combina­
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade violating 
the antitrust laws. As discussed below and in 
chapter 8, the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act in 1932 restricted the federal courts’ right 
to enjoin union conduct on the grounds that it 
violated the antitrust laws.
This, then, was the generally unfavorable 
legal climate in which labor functioned through 
the 1920s until the beginning of the modern 
statutory era.
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B. The Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act, passed by Congress in 
1926, was the first comprehensive federal statu­
tory regulation of labor-management relations. 
It originally covered only railroad employees 
but was amended in 1936 to cover airlines as 
well. The Railway Labor Act is important to all 
employees because it was the first comprehen­
sive federal legislation specifically recognizing 
the right of employees to form unions and en­
gage in collective bargaining.
C. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
In 1932, Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia 
Act, a fundamental turning point in federal statu­
tory regulation. The Act prohibited federal courts 
from issuing injunctions in any labor dispute, re­
gardless of the strike’s purpose. The law prevented 
federal judges from engaging in the previously 
common practice of enjoining a strike because 
the judge did not approve of the strike’s goals or 
methods. However, the law did not guarantee 
the employees any collective bargaining rights. 
Bargaining rights, except in the railroads, were 
still won in a test of economic strength between 
an employer and a union. But with the Norris- 
LaGuardia Act, the federal courts’ injunctive 
power was removed as a weapon against labor.
D. The National Labor Relations Act
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), frequently referred to 
as the Wagner Act after the New York senator 
who sponsored the legislation. The Supreme 
Court upheld the NLRA’s constitutionality in 
1937. The NLRA was enacted as part of Pres­
ident Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal legisla­
tion during the depression and was, in effect, a 
peaceful revolution in labor relations.
The NLRA established employee rights to 
organize, join unions, and engage in collective 
bargaining. The NLRA established employer 
unfair labor practices, making it unlawful for 
an employer to interfere with an employee’s
right to join a union and engage in concerted 
(union) activities. Employers were required to 
bargain in good faith with the union and were 
prohibited from discharging or otherwise dis­
criminating against employees because they en­
gaged in union activities.
The NLRA also established procedures 
by which employees may elect their bargain­
ing agent. Before passage of the NLRA, em­
ployees could secure bargaining rights only 
if their employer voluntarily agreed to rec­
ognize the union or if the employees struck 
and forced recognition. The N LR A  thus 
dramatically paved the way for peaceful 
unionization, especially of industrial workers 
whose employers had consistently opposed 
organizing efforts until then. The provisions 
first enacted in the N LR A  remain the basic 
franchise of American workers in their places 
of employment.
Beyond establishing employee rights and 
employer unfair labor practices, the NLRA es­
tablished the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB, or the Board) to enforce its provisions. 
Today it is common for federal laws to be en­
forced by administrative agencies, as the NLRB 
was established to enforce the NLRA. But 
until .the 1930s, it was far more common for the 
courts to enforce all laws. Congress established 
the NLRB because it mistrusted the manner in 
which the courts, which were historically asso­
ciated with employer interests, might enforce 
the law. Congress also felt the need for a spe­
cialized agency to develop and apply expertise 
in the unique field of labor relations.
E. The Taft-Hartley Act (The Labor 
Management Relations Act)
In 1947, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, 
named after Senator Taft and Congressman 
Hartley, who cosponsored the legislation. The 
Taft-Hardey Act extensively revised the NLRA 
and renamed it the Labor Management Rela­
tions Act (LMRA), 1947. The LMRA, incorpo­
rating the original NLRA as amended by the 
Taft-Hardey Act in 1947, is the basic statute stud­
ied in this book. The term NLRA is still used
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sometimes to refer to the provisions of the orig­
inal NLRA that were continued as part of the 
LMRA.
The original NLRA was prolabor, establish­
ing employee rights and restricting employer acts. 
Congress intended for the Taft-Hartley Act to em­
body what it regarded as a better balance between 
labor and management. For example, the NLRA 
established the right of employees to engage in col­
lective bargaining and other mutual aid and pro­
tection; the Taft-Hartley Act added a provision 
that employees also have the right to refrain from 
any or all such activities. The NLRA established 
employer unfair labor practices now contained in 
LMRA Section 8(a); the Taft-Hartley Act added 
Section 8(b), union unfair labor practices, which 
prohibits unions from interfering with employee 
rights, prohibits unions from coercing or discrim­
inating against employees because of their union 
activities, and requires unions to bargain in good 
faith— provisions that place the same restrictions 
on unions as the NLRA placed on employers. 
The restrictions on secondary boycotts and on 
picketing (see chapter 7) are all an outgrowth of 
the Taft-Hartley Act.
F. The Landrum-Griffin Act
In 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin 
Act, named after the congressional cosponsors, 
formally entitled the Labor Management Re­
porting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA). The 
LMRDA primarily regulates internal union 
matters. It established the so-called Bill of Rights 
for union members; internal union election pro­
cedures; and reporting and disclosure require­
ments for unions, union officers, employers, and 
labor relations consultants, (see chapter 11).
The LMRDA also amended the LMRA by 
adding additional restrictions on picketing, clos­
ing certain “loopholes” in Taft-Hartley, and by 
adding Section 8(e) of the LMRA, prohibiting 
“hot cargo” clauses prohibiting one employer 
from dealing with other employers who are 
nonunion or who are on strike (see chapter 8). 
After 1959, the formal name of the LMRA was 
changed to the “Labor Management Relations 
Act, 1947, as amended,” the present formal title.
G. The Postal Reorganization Act
Chapter 12 of the Postal Reorganization Act of 
1970 established the collective bargaining rights 
of postal workers. The Reorganization Act 
placed the United States Postal Service under 
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board for determining employee representation 
issues and also provided that labor relations in 
the Postal Service would be governed by the 
Labor Management Relations Act to the extent 
not inconsistent with the Reorganization Act it­
self. Two major differences between the rights 
of postal workers and private sector employees 
covered by the LMRA are that the postal work­
ers, as federal employees, do not have the right 
to strike; and the Reorganization Act forbids 
required union membership (a “union shop”) as 
a condition of employment (see chapter 10). The 
Reorganization Act also provides for final and 
binding arbitration if the parties are unable to 
agree on the terms of their collective bargaining 
agreement (called interest arbitration), which is 
not required under the LMRA (see chapter 9).
H. The Health Care Amendments
In 1974, the LMRA was amended to delete the 
provision previously included in Section 2(2) of 
the Act excluding nonprofit hospitals from the 
Act’s coverage. This means that both profit and 
nonprofit hospitals are now covered. In addition 
to extending coverage to nonprofit hospitals, 
the 1974 amendments also enacted special pro­
visions for the health care industry, both profit 
and nonprofit, as to bargaining notice require­
ments (Section 8(d)) and the right to picket or 
strike (Section 8(g)).
I. The Religious Belief Exemption
The 1974 Health Care Amendments added 
Section 19 to the Act that as initially enacted 
provided that a health care industry employee 
who has religious objections to joining a labor 
union cannot be required to join or financially 
support a union as a condition of employment.
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Effective December 24, 1980, Section 19 was 
extensively revised, and the religious objection 
exemption was extended to all employees, not 
just to those in the health care industry. To 
qualify for the exemption, an employee must be 
a member of a bona fide religious organization 
that historically holds conscientious objection to 
joining or financially supporting a labor union 
(see chapter 10).
PART II: An Overview of the Labor 
Management Relations Act 
in Current Form
A word of caution and encouragement is in 
order before reviewing the LMRA in its pres­
ent form. This is an introductory overview pro­
viding a general understanding of the structure 
and coverage of the Act. Do not expect to un­
derstand all of the statute at first reading. The 
statute is complex. Some of it is of interest only 
to lawyers, and other parts are understandable 
only in the light of subsequent court decisions 
interpreting the language discussed in later 
chapters. Sections briefly highlighted here are 
discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.
A. Basic Structure and Definitions: 
Sections 1 through 6
Section 1 of the Act contains basic findings and 
policies stating the background reasons for which 
Congress originally passed the NLRA. Section 2 
of the Act includes the definitions used through­
out the Act. Note the definition of employer in 
Section 2(2). Federal and state governmental 
agencies are excluded from coverage under the 
Act. Labor organizations are covered by the Act 
when acting as an employer for their own employ­
ees. For example, the secretaries of a labor union 
have the rights of employees. Note the definition 
of employee in Section 2(3). An employee who is 
on strike is still entitled to the protection of the 
Act. Agricultural and domestic employees are 
excluded from the Act, as are people employed 
by their own parent or spouse, independent con­
tractors, and supervisors (see chapter 2).
Section 2(11) defines the term supervisor 
and Section 2(12) defines the term professional 
employees. Supervisors are excluded from cov­
erage under the Act, and professional employ­
ees have the right to a bargaining unit of their 
own (see chapter 2).
Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Act all pertain 
to the establishment and structure of the Na­
tional Labor Relations Board (see part III of 
this chapter).
B. Sections 7 and 8: The Unfair Labor 
Practice Sections
Section 7 of the Act establishes the basic right 
of employees to bargain collectively. Section 8 is 
the heart of the Act. Section 8(a) establishes em­
ployer unfair labor practices, and Section 8(b) 
establishes union unfair labor practices. Sec­
tions 8(a)(1) through 8(a)(5) and Sections 8(b)(1) 
through 8(b)(3) generally prohibit either em­
ployers or unions from taking certain actions 
against each other or against employees. Thus, 
Section 8(a)(1) and Section 8(b)(1)(A), respec­
tively, prohibit an employer and a union from 
interfering with employee rights under Sec­
tion 7. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer 
from discriminating against an employee be­
cause the employee is or is not a union mem­
ber, but permits employers and unions to 
agree to make union membership mandatory 
(“union security agreements”) under certain 
circumstances (see chapter 10). Section 8(b)(2) 
prohibits a union from causing the employer 
to violate Section 8(a)(3). Sections 8(a)(5) and 
8(b)(3) require both an employer and a union to 
engage in good-faith bargaining (see chapters 3 
through 6).
Section 8(b)(4) contains the secondary 
boycott provisions of the Act. Section 8(b)(5) 
prohibits excessive or discriminatory union ini­
tiation fees. Section 8(b)(6) is aimed at prohibit­
ing “feather-bedding.” Section 8(b)(7) regulates 
union picketing for recognition or organiza­
tional purposes (see chapters 7 and 8).
Section 8(c) is the so-called free speech 
provision under which employers (and unions) 
are permitted to express their opinion about
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union representation (see chapter 3). Sec­
tion 8(d) defines good-faith bargaining and 
establishes notice requirements before a con­
tract can be terminated or modified (see 
chapter 5).
Section 8(e) prohibits hot cargo provisions 
(see chapter 8). Section 8(f) permits certain pre­
hire contracts in the construction industry and 
shortens the period after which an employee 
may be required to join a union to 7 days after 
hiring in the construction industry, in contrast 
to the 30-day requirement in other industries. 
Section 8(g) contains the special notice require­
ments for a strike or for picketing in the health 
care industry.
C. Section 9: Election Procedures
Section 9 governs union election procedures 
leading to the certification of a union as the 
employees’ bargaining representative (see 
chapter 2). Under Section 9(a), the certified 
representative is the exclusive representative 
of the employees (see chapter 4). Under Sec­
tion 9(b), the Board has very broad discretion 
in determining the appropriate bargaining 
unit of employees whom the union would rep­
resent. However, Section 9(b)(1) gives profes­
sional employees the right to a separate vote 
before they can be included in a unit that in­
cludes nonprofessionals; Section 9(b)(2) places 
certain restrictions on the Board’s right to in­
clude craft employees in a broader unit; and 
Section 9(b)(3) requires that guards be cer­
tified separately in a unit composed only of 
guard employees.
Sections 9(c)(1) through 9(c)(5) regulate 
the election process. Section 9(c)(3) prohibits 
a valid election from being held more than 
once a year, establishes the right of economic 
strikers to vote in an election, and establishes 
the procedure for runoff elections if no choice 
initially receives a majority of the valid votes 
counted. Section 9(e)(1) permits employ­
ees whose contract contains a union security 
clause to hold a deauthorization election re­
scinding the clause.
D. Section 10: Enforcement of the 
Unfair Labor Practice Provisions
Under Section 10(a) the NLRB is established 
as the authority for enforcing the unfair labor 
practice provisions found in Section 8.
Under Section 10(b) an unfair labor prac­
tice charge must be filed within 6 months after 
an unfair labor practice has occurred. Sec­
tions 10(b), (c), and (d) establish trial procedures 
in unfair labor practice cases. Sections 10(e) 
and (f) of the Act set the procedures that the 
Board follows in enforcing its decisions or that 
a party may follow to appeal a Board decision 
to the courts.
Consider the differences between Sec­
tions 10(j) and 10(1) of the Act. Under Sec­
tion 10 (j), the Board (acting through its general 
counsel) has discretionary authority after a 
complaint has been issued to seek a federal 
district court injunction temporarily prohibit­
ing the alleged unfair labor practices, pending 
the outcome of the NLRB proceedings. Under 
Section 10(1), charges alleging violations of Sec­
tions 8(b) (4) (A), (B), or (C); Section 8(b) (7); 
or Section 8(e) of the Act must be given pri­
ority, and the regional director must seek an 
immediate injunction, even before a complaint 
is issued, if there is reasonable cause to believe 
that the charge is true. The mandatory provi­
sions of Section 10(1) primarily apply only to 
union unfair labor practices. The only excep­
tion is for Section 8(e) violations, which may 
apply to either an employer or a union (but 
which involves relatively few charges; see chap­
ter 8). Unions have frequently complained that 
the injunction provisions of the Act are heav­
ily weighed against labor and that, historically, 
the Board seldom invokes its discretionary au­
thority under Section 10(j) to seek temporary 
relief against employer unfair labor practices. 
The Board seeks Section 10(j) injunctions now 
more often than was its practice in the past, but 
the number is still low. Thus, in fiscal year 2012, 
the Board received 169 requests from regional 
offices for permission to file suit for Section 10(j) 
injunctions. The Board authorized such suits 
(which would be filed by the general counsel)
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in 58 cases, and 37 petitions for Section 10(j) 
injunctive relief were actually filed in a federal 
district court. The success rate was 97 percent. 
(The Board regards “success” as either a vol­
untary settlement with the charged employer 
for appropriate relief or substantial success in 
the litigation.)2 This high figure may reflect 
the close scrutiny the Board gives to a case be­
fore it authorizes the filing of a Section 10(j) 
action. The general counsel’s willingness to 
seek injunctions has undoubtedly deterred vi­
olations in other cases as well. Still, in contrast 
to Section 10(1), where temporary injunctions 
are routinely requested unless the charged 
party voluntarily agrees to stop the alleged 
misconduct pending the outcome of the case, 
Section 10(j) injunctions are limited to fairly 
extreme cases of flagrant violations of the Act.
Section 10(k) is a unique provision giving 
the Board authority to determine the merits of 
a work assignment dispute if any party to the 
dispute threatens to strike, picket, or engage in 
other concerted activities in order to force a work 
assignment (see chapter 8). Section 11 sets out the 
investigatory powers of the Board, the manner 
in which Board documents are served, and other 
procedural matters. Section 12 makes it a crim­
inal act to interfere with the Board’s processes.
E. Protection of the Right to Strike:
Section 13
Section 13 preserves the right to strike. Two 
other important sections deal with the right to 
strike. Section 8(b)(4) provides that “nothing 
contained in this subsection (b) shall be con­
strued to make unlawful a refusal by any per­
son to enter upon the premises of any employer 
(other than his own employer), if the employees 
of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified 
or approved by a representative of such employ­
ees whom such employer is required to recog­
nize under this Act.” Under the provisions of 
Section 502 an individual employee cannot be
2 Source: National Labor Relations Board, Performance 
and Accountability Report, 2012, P. 53.
required to work without his or her consent, 
and employees who quit in good faith because 
of abnormally dangerous conditions are not 
considered to be on strike (see chapter 6).
Section 14(a) permits supervisors to be 
members of a labor organization. However, 
employers are not required to bargain about the 
working conditions of supervisors or to recog­
nize a supervisor’s union.
Section 14(b) permits individual states to 
pass so-called right-to-work laws. Section 19, as 
discussed above, exempts employees with a reli­
gious objection from being required to join or 
financially support a union under a contractual 
union security clause (see chapter 10).
F. Titles II and III of the Act
Title II of the Act establishes the Federal Me­
diation and Conciliation Service and defines its 
authority3 *.
Section 301 authorizes the enforcement of col­
lective bargaining agreements. Section 301 has en­
couraged the growth of arbitration rather than the 
courts or strikes as the primary method of resolv­
ing labor-management disputes when these par­
ties have an agreement in effect, (see chapter 9).
Section 302 restricts employer payments to 
union representatives. This section prohibits 
union representatives from receiving gifts from 
employers and prohibits an employer from giv­
ing financial support to a union (see chapter 4). 
Important subsections include Section 302(c)(4), 
which permits an employer to deduct union dues 
from an employee’s wages; and Section 302(c)(5), 
which establishes the basic structure and pur­
pose of jointly administered fringe benefit trust 
funds. The establishment and operation of 
employee fringe benefit funds are extensively 
regulated by the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA), effective Labor Day 1974.
3 This book does not discuss the FMCS in detail except
as the agency’s activities relate to statutory matters such as 
bargaining notice requirements. Most of the agency’s activ­
ities relate to the bargaining process beyond the scope of 
this text.
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Section 303 permits a court to award dam­
ages against a union engaging in unfair labor 
practices in violation of Section 8(b)(4) (the sec­
ondary boycott provisions). Sections 301, 302, 
and 303 are all enforced by the courts rather 
than the NLRB.4
PART III: Structure and Procedure of the 
National Labor Relations Board
The NLRB administers the LMRA following 
set procedures in unfair labor practice and rep­
resentation cases established by the statute and 
by regulations issued by the Board. Most of the 
principles discussed in this book were devel­
oped by the NLRB in decisions made through 
the procedures outlined here. This outline gives 
the basic information needed to understand the 
process. Do not expect to remember the de­
tails of these procedures at first reading. Read 
this part now to get a general understanding 
of the Board’s structure and procedures. Then 
review this material as you study the following 
chapters.
A. The National Labor Relations 
Board and the General Counsel
The National Labor Relations Board, located 
in Washington, D.C., has five members. The 
members, who serve for 5-year terms, are ap­
pointed by the president and approved by a vote 
of the Senate. One of the five is appointed as 
Board chairman by the president with Senate 
confirmation. Usually the Board decides cases 
using three-member panels, but important cases 
can be decided by all five members (en banc).
In addition to the Board, the Labor Man­
agement Relations Act established a separate, 
independent general counsel, also appointed by 
the president and approved by the Senate for 
a 4-year term. Figure 1.1 is an organizational
4 The relationship between the NLRB and the federal 
courts in enforcing the Act is discussed in chapter 15.
chart of the National Labor Relations Board 
and of the Office of the General Counsel.5
To understand the functions of the 
five-member Board and the general counsel, 
think of the relationship between a prosecutor 
and a judge. In unfair labor practice cases (Sec­
tion 8), the Board acts as the judge, and it de­
cides whether the charged party (the defendant) 
has violated the Act. Judges do not decide cases 
unless a prosecutor brings a charge alleging a 
violation of the law. The Board functions in a 
similar way, hearing only cases in which a com­
plaint has been filed alleging an unfair labor 
practice. The general counsel fills the prosecu­
tor function. Anyone may file a charge with the 
general counsel alleging that the Act has been 
violated.6 The general counsel investigates and 
decides whether a charge has merit. If it does, 
the general counsel issues a complaint charging 
that the Act has been violated, just as a prose­
cutor might file a complaint in a criminal case. 
The case is then tried, and the Board decides 
whether there has been a violation, just as a 
judge (or jury) might in a criminal case.
The division of authority between the 
Board and the general counsel applies only to 
unfair labor practice cases under Section 8. The 
general counsel has no authority to decide elec­
tion issues under Section 9; these are within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. However, 
the Board has delegated administrative respon­
sibility over the regional offices in certain mat­
ters to the general counsel. Thus, for example, 
the general counsel has issued administrative 
time guidelines for the regions to follow in pro­
cessing both unfair labor practice charges and 
representation petitions. The authority for the 
guidelines is derived from the general coun­
sel’s own statutory authority under Section 10 
to prosecute unfair labor practices and from
5 The charts in this chapter are based on publications of 
the National Labor Relations Board and reproduced with 
the agency’s permission. Please visit the NLRB website, 
www.nlrb.gov, to review other charts and statistical infor­
mation concerning the agency’s operations.
6 People frequently refer to filing a charge with the 
Board, but, as discussed in this chapter, a charge is actually 
filed with the general counsel.
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Figure 1.1 NLRB organization chart (chart indicates incumbent officials as of January 2014 and is subject to change)
authority delegated by the Board under Sec­
tion 9 to investigate and determine representa­
tion issues.
B. The Regional Offices
Although the headquarters for both the Board 
and general counsel are in Washington, D.C., 
the workload is far too heavy to handle from 
Washington. Thus, the Board has regional of­
fices across the United States that administer the 
Act. There are currently 26 regions. Each re­
gion is headed by a regional director appointed
by the Board who serves two functions. First, 
the regional director is the local representative 
of the general counsel in processing unfair labor 
practice charges and, second, pursuant to au­
thority delegated by the Board, the regional di­
rector renders decisions in representation cases 
under Section 9. The Board has recently reor­
ganized its regional structure and is still con­
sidering further changes. A number of regional 
offices, subregions, or field offices are or have 
been merged or the geographic area they serve 
is modified. For the latest list of the regions 
with a map of their geographic coverage, go to 
www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/regional-offices.
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This book frequently refers to the Board, 
the general counsel, or the regional director as 
taking certain action. That is because they are 
ultimately responsible for certain decisions. Re­
member, however, that the Board, the general 
counsel, and the regional director all have large 
staffs to support them. As indicated in the orga­
nizational chart (Fig. 1.1), each Board member 
has a personal staff to assist the member, and 
the Board has an executive secretary who ad­
ministers a large office staff to assist the Board 
in its overall functions. The general counsel 
has a number of associate and assistant general 
counsels in charge of the various functions of the 
office. The regional offices have a large staff of 
attorneys and field examiners under the super­
vision of the regional director. Field examiners 
are career civil servant employees performing 
primarily investigatory functions in unfair labor 
practice and representation matters.
C. Jurisdiction of the NLRB
It is important to understand the limited juris­
diction of the Board’s authority. Some employees 
go to the NLRB every time they are dissatisfied 
with an action of their employer or union. But 
the Board was not established to regulate the 
entire relationship between employers, unions, 
and employees. The Board enforces only Sec­
tion 8 (unfair labor practices) and Section 9 
(elections) of the Act. All the other provisions 
of the LMRA provide the framework within 
which the Board enforces these two sections.
The Board’s authority is even more limited be­
cause some employers and some employees are not 
covered by the Act. Thus, state and federal agen­
cies are excluded from coverage under Section 2(2) 
as are persons subject to the Railway Labor Act.
In general, to be excluded from the Board’s 
jurisdiction as a state agency (a subdivision of 
the state), the employing organization must be 
created directly by the state or administered 
by individuals who are responsible to public 
officials or to the general electorate. An orga­
nization is regarded as responsible to the gen­
eral electorate only if the persons eligible to 
vote for the organization’s governing body are
sufficiently the same as the voters in general 
political elections, so that the organization is 
subject to a similar type and degree of popular 
political control. Thus, for example, electrical 
cooperatives are usually not exempt from the 
Board’s jurisdiction as political subdivisions 
because they are not directly created by a state 
and a cooperative is usually administered by 
individuals who are not responsible to public 
officials or to the general electorate, but, rather, 
only to the cooperative’s own members.
Agricultural workers, domestic employ­
ees in private homes, independent contractors, 
and supervisors are excluded by the definition 
of covered employees under Section 2(3) (see 
chapter 2). As a matter of policy, the Board has 
also declined jurisdiction over the horse racing 
and dog racing industries, primarily on the 
grounds that those industries are subject to ex­
tensive state control including control over some 
aspects of labor relations policies.
1. Employers Supported by Government Funds
The Board’s position as to its jurisdiction over 
contractors (both for profit and nonprofit) that 
provide services to or for an exempt governmental 
agency, such as head start programs, child care, 
and medical clinics that are supported by state 
and/or federal funds, has varied over the years. 
Since 1995, however, in its decision in Manage­
ment Training Corp. (1995),7 the Board will assert 
jurisdiction over a contractor with close ties to an 
exempt government agency if it meets the defi­
nition of employer under Section 2(2) of the Act 
and meets the applicable monetary standard (see 
below) for asserting jurisdiction. Governmental 
control may restrict subjects for bargaining but 
is not a basis for declining jurisdiction.
2. Organizations Operated by Religious 
Groups
The Supreme Court held in N L R B  v. Catholic 
Bishop o f Chicago8 that the Board cannot assert 
jurisdiction over instructors in church-operated
7 See legal principle 1 .A.
8 See legal principle 1 .B.
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schools because such jurisdiction would violate 
the First Amendment to the United States Con­
stitution establishing freedom of religion and 
separation of church and state. The Supreme 
Court concluded, in overruling the Board’s de­
cision, that the religious and secular purposes 
of church-sponsored schools are so interwoven 
that the Board’s jurisdiction would unconstitu­
tionally interject the Board into the operations 
and policies of the church. The Board has held 
that the Catholic Bishop decision applies to re­
ligiously affiliated colleges and universities as 
well as to parochial, elementary, and secondary 
schools, even when those schools are controlled 
by a predominantly lay board. With regard to 
instructional employees in all these types of 
schools, the test most often applied currently 
is one set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit in University o f Great Falls 
v. NLRB  (2002).9 Under that test, the NLRB 
does not have jurisdiction over instructional 
employees in any educational institutions that 
(1) “holds itself out to students, faculty and 
community as providing a religious educational 
environment”; (2) “is organized as a nonprofit”; 
and (3) “is affiliated with, or owned, operated, 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recog­
nized religious organization, or with an entity, 
membership of which is determined, at least in 
part, with reference to religion.”
In contrast, the Board has consistently as­
serted jurisdiction over church-operated, non­
profit social agencies, such as nursing homes and 
hospitals, and over noninstructional employees 
of schools and childcare employers because such 
organizations essentially function the same as 
their secular counterparts; and their activities 
only tangentially relate to the sponsoring orga­
nization’s religious mission.
3. The Commerce Standard
The Board’s jurisdiction covers only employers 
whose operations affect commerce as defined 
in Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Section 
9(c)(1) empowers the Board to hold elections
9 See legal principle l.B.
only if it determines that there is a question 
concerning representation affecting commerce. 
Section 10(a) empowers the Board “to prevent 
any person from engaging in any unfair labor 
practice [listed in Section 8] affecting com­
merce” (emphasis added). Why does the statute 
have these restrictions, and what do they mean?
The federal government has limited consti­
tutional authority. Some conduct is not subject to 
federal regulation. The broadest scope of Con­
gress’s constitutional authority is that Congress, 
under the commerce clause of the Constitution 
(Article 1, Section 8), can regulate any activity 
that affects commerce among the states. This is 
the clause under which most federal legislation in 
the fields of labor, education, and social welfare 
is upheld. The LMRA was originally upheld on 
the legal theory that labor unrest disrupts com­
merce. Goods will not flow in commerce be­
tween states if there is a strike. Thus, Congress 
can regulate labor relations to maintain indus­
trial peace and prevent disruption of commerce.
Because the LMRA applies to any employer 
or unfair labor practice affecting commerce, the 
statute has the broadest possible constitutional 
reach, covering most small employers. For ex­
ample, the operation of a small business whose 
customers are all located within the same state 
as the business would still “affect commerce” if 
the business purchases supplies produced in an­
other state. A business that purchases all of its 
supplies within the state would still affect com­
merce if it has customers in or if its products are 
sold in another state. A business that operates 
solely within a single state may still affect com­
merce if a labor dispute at the business would 
affect the operations of another employer that 
does engage in interstate commerce. For exam­
ple, a small manufacturer may supply a part to 
another manufacturer in the same state for a 
product shipped to other states. If the manufac­
turer of the part is shut down by a labor dispute, 
the interstate manufacturer will not be able to 
produce the product, and the flow of goods in 
interstate commerce will be disrupted. The op­
erations of the parts manufacturer, therefore, 
affect commerce under the Act. Flowever, some 
employers’ operations may be so small that they 
might not affect commerce. Thus, although the
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operations of almost all employers would affect 
commerce as the courts have interpreted this 
term, employees must be aware that some em­
ployers may not meet the standard.
4. The Board’s Jurisdictional Standards
In addition to the constitutional and statutory 
requirement that an unfair labor practice or 
representation matter affect commerce under 
Section 8 or 9, the Board has set certain mon­
etary jurisdictional standards that an employer 
must meet before the Board will assert juris­
diction. Because so many small employers meet 
the constitutional and statutory requirement 
of affecting commerce, the Board established 
these jurisdictional standards to avoid being 
engulfed with more cases than it can possibly 
handle. These standards apply to both unfair 
labor practice and representation cases.
The monetary standards that an employer 
must meet before the Board will assert juris­
diction vary by industry and may be based ei­
ther on the amount of sales or on gross revenue. 
Nonretail businesses must either have $50,000 
in direct or indirect sales outside their state or 
make direct or indirect purchases of supplies 
from businesses in other states in that amount. 
Direct sale or purchase means that the transac­
tion is directly with the out-of-state consumer 
or supplier. Indirect sale or purchase means that 
the employer sells to or buys from another com­
pany within the same state that meets one of the 
Board’s direct jurisdictional standards. A non­
retail business must meet either the sales or sup­
ply standard. Costs of sales and supplies cannot 
be combined to meet the $50,000 standard.
The general retail enterprise standard is at 
least $500,000 annual volume of business. Ho­
tels and taxicab companies must also meet the 
$500,000 standard. Other industries have dif­
ferent annual volume of business jurisdictional 
requirements: $250,000 for public utilities and 
transportation companies; $200,000 for news­
papers; $100,000 for communication compa­
nies; $100,000 for nursing homes; $250,000 for 
all other health care institutions; and $1,000,000 
for private colleges and symphony orchestras.
Interstate transportation companies must 
meet a $50,000 annual income requirement.
The Board will assert jurisdiction over defense 
contractors that affect commerce and have a 
substantial defense impact, regardless of the 
monetary amount. The Board has established a 
jurisdictional standard of $250,000 annual rev­
enue for all social service organizations other 
than those for which there is another specific 
standard applicable for the type of activity in 
which the organization is engaged. For exam­
ple, the specific $100,000 standard would still 
apply for a nursing home.
Thus, if an employer commits an act that 
you believe may violate the LMRA or if you are 
about to organize a new employer, first consider 
whether the employer meets the definition of an 
employer covered by the Act and whether the 
employees meet the definition of an employee 
under the Act. Be sure alleged employer mis­
conduct is the type covered by the Act, not, 
for example, just a contract violation. Then 
consider whether the employer meets both the 
statutory standard of affecting commerce and 
the appropriate Board monetary jurisdictional 
standard. Proceed to the Board only after rea­
sonably satisfying yourself on all these matters.
D. Processing an Unfair Labor 
Practice Charge10
1. Filing the Charge
The procedures followed in unfair labor practice 
cases are outlined in Figure 1.2. The first step is 
filing a document called a “charge.” The Board 
has a standard form for filing a charge that is
10 The processing time for serving and/or filing certain 
document during the course of Board proceedings and the 
number of copies required as noted in this chapter in both 
unfair labor practice and representation matters are those 
required when such documents are filed in paper form. 
However, the Board has an extensive E-Filing Program, for 
which parties may register, which permits most documents, 
other than the initial unfair labor practice charge or rep­
resentation petition, to be filed with the Board and served 
on the other parties by email. This prevents the need to file 
multiple “hard” copies by the due date. For complete infor­
mation on this system, go to www.nlrb.gov, and click on 
E-file, or contact your Regional Office. Most NLRB proce­
dural requirements have been in effect for many years, and 
are quite stable despite changes in the Boards membership 
and shifts in the substantive law. They are, however, subject 
to change, and it is therefore advisable to “double-check” on 
the relevant filing and service requirements that apply for 
any proceeding in which you may be involved.
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CHARGE
Filed with Regional Director; 
alleges Unfair labor practice by 
employer or labor organization
INJUNCTION
Regional Director must ask district 
court for temporary restraining 
order in unlawful boycott and 
certain picketing cases.
INVESTIGATION
Regional Director determines 
whether formal action should 
be taken.
INJUNCTION
General Counsel may with Board 
approval ask district court for 
temporary restraining order after 
complaint is issued in certain 
serious unfair labor practice cases.
COMPLAINT AND ANSWER
Regional Director issues complaint 
and notice of hearing. Respondent 
files answer in 10 days.
HEARING AND DECISION
Administrative Law Judge presides 
over a trial and files a decision 
recommending either (1) order to 
cease and desist from unfair labor 
practice and affirmative relief or 
(2) dismissal of complaint. If no 
timely exceptions are filed to the 
Administrative Law judge’s 
decision, the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge 
automatically become the 
decision and order of the Board.
WITHDRAWAL-REFUSAL TO 
ISSUE COMPLAINT-SETTLEMENT
Charge may with Agency approval be 
withdrawn before or after complaint is 
issued. Regional Director may refuse to 
issue a complaint; refusal (dismissal of 
charge) may be appealed to General 
Counsel.
Settlement of case may occur before or 
after issuance of complaint (informal 
settlement agreement subject to 
approval of Regional Director; formal 
settlement agreement executed 
simultaneously with or after issuance of 
complaint, subject to approval of Board). 
A formal settlement agreement will 
provide for entry of the Board’s order 
and may provide for judgement from 
the court of appeals enforcing the 
Board’s order.
DISMISSAL REMEDIAL ORDER ORDER DISPOSITION
Board finds respondent did not Board finds respondent committed Board remands case to
commit unfair labor practice and unfair labor practice and orders Regional Director for
dismisses complaint. respondent to cease and desist and further action.
to remedy such unfair labor
practice.
COURT ENFORCEMENT 
AND REVIEW
Court of appeals can enforce, set 
aside or remand all or part of the 
case. U.S. Supreme Court reviews 
appeals from courts of appeals.
Figure 1.2 National Labor Relations Board: Basic procedures in cases involving charges of unfair labor practices
used in all regional offices. A copy of the form is 
available at www.nlrb.gov (home-what-we-do- 
resources (forms). The person filing a charge, 
called the charging party, states the facts con­
stituting a violation of the Act. Anyone— an
employer, an employee, or a union— can file 
a charge. Usually the facts alleged in a charge 
are set forth in general terms rather than in 
great detail. The regional office will assist the 
charging party in filing the charge. A charge
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must be filed and served within 6 months of 
the date of the alleged unfair labor practice, 
or else it will be barred as untimely under 
Section 10(b).
A charge must be based on conduct occur­
ring within the Section 10(b) time limitation. 
However, earlier conduct may be considered as 
evidence to support a later charge to the extent 
that it “sheds light” on the nature of conduct oc­
curring within the 6-month period. The date 
for filing a charge begins with the date there 
is unequivocal and unconditional notice of an 
alleged unlawful act, not the date the act’s con­
sequences become effective (e.g., from the date 
that an employee is told he or she is going to 
be discharged even though the discharge itself 
is not effective immediately). There is a narrow 
exception for so-called continuing violations. 
For example, suppose an employer established 
a work rule on January 15 of a given year that 
unlawfully restricted the right of employees to 
discuss their working conditions at any time 
during the workday, but did not actually disci­
pline any employee for violating the rule until 
July 30. A charge filed in August challenging 
the unlawful discipline would be timely be­
cause it was filed within six months of the un­
lawful disciplinary action even though the rule 
was adopted more than six months before the 
charge was filed. A discharge is not a continu­
ing violation, so a charge must be filed within 6 
months of the violation. The continuing viola­
tion principle is narrowly applied and subject to 
varying interpretations in its application. Thus, 
it is usually better to file a charge within six 
months of the first alleged violation rather than 
to rely on the continuing violation principle to 
extend the limitations period.
A charge is filed in the regional office in 
the region in which the unfair labor prac­
tice occurred. A copy of the charge must be 
served, usually by mail, on the charged party. 
The regional director cannot refuse to accept a 
charge even though the facts alleged are clearly 
outside the Board’s jurisdiction. A charge is 
simply an allegation; the fact that a charge is 
filed is not an indication that the facts alleged 
are true or that they constitute a violation of 
the Act.
The NLRB uses a standard case numbering 
system. The first two numbers indicate the re­
gion in which the charge is filed; the next two 
letters indicate whether the charge is against an 
employer or a union and the provision of Sec­
tion 8 allegedly violated. The final numbers 
(six digits) are the numerical sequence of the 
charge. This use to be the number within the 
region where the charge was filed, but there is 
now a single nationwide numerical list in the 
order filed. For example, in the case number 
14-CA-096323, the 14 indicates that the charge 
was filed in the fourteenth region, C indicates 
that the case is an unfair labor practice charge, 
and A indicates that the charge alleged a violation 
of Section 8(a), a charge against an employer. 
The 096323 is the sequence number on the na­
tional list. Figure 1.3 is an NLRB chart of the 
types of cases and the lettering system that the 
Board uses in both unfair labor practice and 
representation cases. Unfair labor practice cases 
begin with a C. For this reason, unfair labor 
practice charges are frequently referred to by 
labor practitioners as “C cases.”
2. Regional Determination and Appeal
After a charge is filed in the regional office, it 
is referred to either an attorney or a field exam­
iner within the office for investigation. The in­
vestigator reviews the facts, researches the law, 
and takes sworn statements (affidavits) from 
witnesses. The investigator asks the charged 
party for a statement of its position and any 
evidence it wishes to offer in its defense. The 
charged party must decide whether and to what 
extent it will cooperate with the investigation.
Sometimes a charge filed with a regional 
office involves a unique question or a legal area 
in which the Board’s position is unclear. In 
that case, the regional director may refer the 
charge to the Division of Advice of the Office 
of the General Counsel. This office advises the 
regional directors on difficult or unique cases. 
Occasionally the Advice Division issues memo­
randums or directives to the regional directors 
on how to handle cases raising certain issues. 
Sometimes the general counsel requires that 
all cases raising a certain issue be forwarded
I. CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
(C CASES)
Charge against Employer Charge against Labor Organization
Section o f . , , 
the Act
Section o f  
the Act
Section o f  „ „  
the Act
Section o f  .... 
the Act
B(a)(l) To interfere with, restrain, or 
coerce employees in exercise of their 
rights under Section 7 (to join or assist 
a labor organization or to refrain).
8(a)(2) To dominate or interfere with the 
formation or administration of a labor 
organization or contribute financial or 
other support to it.
8(a)(3) By discrimination in regard to 
hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or condition of employment to 
encourage or discourage membership 
in any labor organization.
8(a)(4) To discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against employees 
because they have given testimony 
under the Act.
8(a)(5) To refuse to bargain collectively 
with representatives of its employees.
B(b)(1) (A) To restrain or coerce 
employees in exercise of their rights 
under Section 7 (to join or assist a labor 
organization or to refrain).
8(b)(1)(B) To restrain or coerce 
an emplayer in the selection of its 
representatives for collective bargaining 
or adjustment of grievances.
8(b) (2) To cause or attempt to cause an 
employer to discriminate against an 
employee.
8(b)(3) To refuse to bargain collectively 
with an employer.
8(b)(5) To require of employees the 
payment of excessive or discriminatory 
fees for membership.
8(b)(6) To cause or attempt to cause an 
employer to pay or agree to pay money 
or other thing of value for services 
which are not performed or not to be 
performed.
8(b)(4)(i) To engage in, or induce or 
encourage any individual employed by 
any person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce to engage 
in, a strike, work stoppage, or boycott, or 
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any 
person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce, where in 
either case an object is:
(A) To force or require any employer or 
self-employed person to join any labor or 
employer organization or to enter into 
any agreement prohibited by Section 8(e).
(B) To force or require any person 
to cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in 
the products of any other producer, 
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease 
doing business with any other person,
or force or require any other employer to 
recognize or bargain with a labor 
organization as the representative of 
its employees unless such labor organiza­
tion has been so certified.
(C) To force or require any employer to 
recognize or bargain with a particular 
labor organization as the representative 
of its employees if another labor 
organization has been certified as the 
representative.
8(b)(4)(i) To engage in, or induce or 
encourage any individual employed by 
any person engaged in commerce or in 
an industry affecting commerce to 
engage in, a strike, work stoppage, or 
boycott, or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or 
restrain any person engaged in 
commerce or in an industry affecting 
commerce, where in either case an 
object is:
(D) To force or require any employer to 
assign particular work to employees in a 
particular labor organization or in a 
particular trade, craft, or class rather 
than to employees in another trade, 
craft, or class, unless such employer is 
failing to conform to an appropriate 
Board order or certification.
Section o f  „ „  
the Act
8(g) To strike, picket, or otherwise 
concertedly refuse to work at any health 
care institution without notifying the 
institution and the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service in writing 10 
days prior to such action.
(Continued)
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I. CHARGES OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
(C CASES)
Charge against Labor Organization Charge against Labor Organization and Employer
By or on Behalf 
of Employees
By or on Behalf 
of Employees
Section o f  „ p 
the Act
Section o f  
the Act
Section o f  ... .  
the Act
Section o f . _  
the Act UU
8(b)(7) To picket, or cause or threaten the 
picketing of, any employer where an object is 
to force or require an employer to recognize 
or bargain with a labor organization as the 
representative of its employees, or to force or 
require the employees of an employer to select 
such labor organization as their collective­
bargaining representative, unless such labor 
organization is currently certified as the 
representative o f such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully 
recognized any other labor organization and a 
question concerning representation may not 
appropriately be raised under Section 9(c).
(B) where within the preceding 12 months a 
valid election under Section 9(c) has been 
conducted, or
(C) where picketing has been conducted 
without a petition under Section 9(c) being 
filed within a reasonable period o f time not to 
exceed 30 days from the commencement of the 
picketing; except where the picketing is for the 
purpose of truthfully advising the: public 
(including consumers) that an employer does 
not employ members of, or have a contract 
with, a labor organization, and it does not have 
an effect o f interference with deliveries or 
services.
8(e) To enter into any contract 
or agreement (any labor 
organization and any employer) 
whereby such employer ceases 
or refrains or agrees to cease or 
refrain from handling or dealing 
in any product of any other 
employer, or to cease doing 
business with any other person.
9(c)(l)(A)(i) Alleging that a substantial 
number of employees wish to be 
represented for collective bargaining 
and their employer declines to recognize 
their representative.*
9(e)(1) Alleging the employees (30 
percent or more o f an appropriate 
unit) wish to rescind an existing 
union security agreement.
Section o f  R. . 
the Act
By a labor Organization 
or an Employer
9(c) (]) (A) (ii) Alleging that a substantial 
number o f employees assen that the 
certified or currently recognized 
bargaining representative is no longer 
their representative:
Section o f  , , . ,  , /  RM the Act
Subpart C Seeking clarification of an 
existing bargaining unit.
By an Employer Section o f  „ .  . the Act
Section o f  n ,
L  A KMthe Act Subpart C Seeking amendment of an 
outstanding certification of bargaining 
representative.9(C)(1)(B) Alleging that one or more claims for recognition as exclusive 
bargaining representative have been 
received by the employer.*
*If an 8(b)(7) charge has been filed 
involving the same employer, these 
Statements in RC, RD, and RM 
petitions are not required.
Figure 1.3 Types of cases
Charges filed with the National Labor Relations Board are letter-coded and numbered. Unfair labor practice charges are classified as “C” cases and petitions for certification or decertification of
re p re se n ta t iv e s  a s  “ R ” c a ses . T h is  c h a r t  in d ic a te s  th e  le tte r  co d es  u sed  fo r “C ” c a se s , a t le f t , a n d  “R ” c a se s , a b o v e , a n d  a lso  p re sen ts  a  s u m m a ry  o f  e a ch  sec tio n  in vo lved .
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to Advice for consideration. This ensures that 
similar problems arising throughout the coun­
try are handled uniformly.
If a case is referred to the general counsel 
for a decision, the local Board agent assigned to 
the case informs all parties that the case is “on 
advice.”
As discussed above, cases in which the 
Board is required to seek an injunction under 
Section 10(1) of the Act have priority for in­
vestigation. Sometimes a union charged with 
a violation of Sections 8(b)(4), 8(b)(7), or 8(e) 
of the Act, to which Section 10(1) applies, vol­
untarily stops the alleged unlawful conduct 
after a charge is filed and gives the regional of­
fice assurance that it will not resume the con­
duct while the charge is pending. In that case, 
the regional director does not have to seek an 
injunction.
If the regional director, after investiga­
tion, or consultation with Advice, determines 
that the charge lacks merit, the Board agent 
conducting the investigation will contact the 
charging party and suggest that the charge be 
withdrawn. This is basically a face-saving ges­
ture to avoid a formal dismissal. If the charging 
party will not withdraw the charge, and the 
regional director has determined that it lacks 
merit, the regional director dismisses the 
charge. If the charge is dismissed, the charging 
party can appeal the dismissal to the General 
Counsel Office of Appeals.
If the charging party is not planning to ap­
peal, it is best in most cases to withdraw the 
charge rather than having it formally dismissed. 
The only exception might be if the charging 
party wants detailed reasons for the regional 
director’s decision. A union, for example, might 
want to present its members with the regional 
director’s detailed reasons if the regional direc­
tor dismisses a union charge on issues the mem­
bers consider to be very significant.
The regional director uses one of two dis­
missal formats: a short or long form. The short- 
form dismissal briefly states that the charge has 
been dismissed and can be appealed, without 
giving any detailed reasons for the dismissal. 
The long form gives a detailed explanation 
of the reasons. The charging party’s choice is
again a tactical one. The charging party is al­
lowed to choose the format the regional director 
uses. The long form gives the charging party a 
more detailed statement of the regional direc­
tor’s reasons and may make the appeal slightly 
more effective. On the other hand, the long 
form frequently contains strong statements sup­
porting the charged party. A union might not 
want a strong statement upholding the employ­
er’s position on the record and should therefore 
request the short form. Fewer than 10 percent 
of the regional directors’ decisions that are ap­
pealed to the general counsel are reversed. The 
general counsel’s decision is final. There is no 
further appeal to the Board. Also, there is no 
right to court review of the general counsel’s de­
cision to issue or not issue a complaint.
A general counsel’s decision upholding the 
regional director’s dismissal is not binding on 
either an arbitrator or a court should there be 
proceedings before either on the same issue giv­
ing rise to the unfair labor practice charge, nor 
is the dismissal binding on the Board itself in 
any other case. Still, there may be an adverse 
psychological effect if the general counsel re­
fuses to proceed. Thus, the decision to appeal 
the regional director’s determination must 
be carefully considered. An appeal should be 
taken only if the case is sufficiently important 
and there is a reasonable likelihood of success.
3. Settlement or Issuance of a Complaint
If the regional director determines, based on 
the investigation, that a charge has merit, the 
director will usually advise the charged party 
of this determination and propose a settlement. 
A settlement is an agreement in which the vi­
olator, whether an employer or a union, agrees 
to cease the particular unfair labor practice 
and take whatever action may be necessary to 
correct the wrong, including back pay if ap­
propriate. Under a recent policy change, the 
general counsel will now accept a settlement 
that provides for front as well as back pay for 
a discharged employee who agrees in writ­
ing to waive the right to reinstatement to his/ 
her former employment. A written settlement 
may be either informal or formal. An informal
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settlement is approved by the regional director. 
A formal settlement is usually used only in ag­
gravated or extensive unfair labor practice cases. 
A formal settlement is approved by the Board 
in conjunction with the issuance of a complaint. 
The Board order approving the settlement re­
quires that the charged party take certain reme­
dial action, and provides for the entry of a court 
of appeals judgment approving the Board order 
(so that the Board can seek a contempt citation 
from the court if the employer fails to comply 
with the settlement). If the charged party is un­
willing to enter into such a settlement, the re­
gional director issues a complaint. A complaint 
is a detailed legal document, drafted with the 
same care and precision as a suit to be filed in 
court. It contains detailed allegations to show 
that the Board’s jurisdictional standards are 
met, summarizes the facts giving rise to the vi­
olation, and lists the provisions of the Act that 
have been violated. Even after a complaint has 
been issued, the Board will still try to settle the 
case. This settlement rate usually varies be­
tween 91 and 96 percent in any given year."
A charge can be filed by anyone, and filing 
a charge does not indicate that the facts alleged 
are true or that the charge has merit. In contrast, 
a complaint is issued only if the regional direc­
tor determines that the charge has merit. As 
discussed above, after a complaint is issued, the 
Board has power under Section 10(j) of the Act 
to seek a preliminary injunction or temporary 
restraining order from a district court against 
the alleged violations. Procedurally, the general 
counsel may request that the Board authorize a 
Section 10 (j) injunction if the general counsel 
believes that the case warrants it. This request is 
reviewed by the Board, which may then autho­
rize the general counsel to seek injunctive relief 
in the Board’s behalf. As discussed in Part II-D 
above, this authority is relatively rarely used.
Basically, a complaint describes in greater 
detail the facts generally alleged in the charge. 
However, a complaint may allege acts that were 
not even mentioned in the charge and that the 
charging party might not have even known 1
11 Source: NLRB Performance and Accountability Re­
port, 2012, p. 49.
about. The general counsel is permitted to base 
a complaint on the charges alleged and on any 
additional violations occurring within the lim­
itations period that the Board investigator dis­
covers during the course of the investigation 
that are reasonably related to the charge. Usu­
ally, to avoid any question of the relationship, 
the regional director will ask a charging party 
to file an amended charge alleging additional 
violations discovered during the course of the 
investigation.
A charge must be filed and served within 6 
months of the date of the alleged unfair labor 
practice. (Thus a charging party should, if pos­
sible, avoid waiting until the last minute to file 
a charge or risk the chance that it may not be 
served in time.) However, there is no maximum 
time limit between when a charge is filed and 
a complaint is issued. Sometimes many months 
may elapse between the filing of a charge and 
the issuance of a complaint, especially in com­
plex cases that have been referred to Advice 
for a decision or in which a complaint is issued 
pursuant to successful appeal to the Office of 
Appeals.
4. Trial Procedures and Board Decision
After a complaint is issued, there is a hearing 
before an administrative law judge, commonly 
referred to as an ALJ (previously known as trial 
examiner). The administrative law judge, a civil 
service appointee, is independent of the Board 
and hears the case independently. Unfair labor 
practice cases are tried in the region where the 
case arose. There are currently approximately 
34 administrative law judges. They are per­
manently attached to offices in Atlanta, New 
York, Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, 
but travel to the regions for hearings.
The trial of an unfair labor practice case 
is similar to a typical civil trial, except there is 
no jury. The ALJ functions very much like a 
federal judge. An unfair labor practice trial 
is a formal proceeding, very different from 
typically informal arbitration hearings. Sec­
tion 10(b) of the Act provides that the federal 
rules of evidence apply in an unfair labor prac­
tice case hearing so far as practicable. The ALJ
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assigned to a case will usually contact the par­
ties several weeks prior to the hearing to discuss 
the possibility of settlement as well as discuss 
pretrial procedural issues. In an effort to en­
courage settlements prior to trial, the Board, 
in March 2009, permanently established a vol­
untary ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) 
program to mediate unfair labor practice mat­
ters pending before it. This program is available 
at any stage in the unfair labor practice litiga­
tion process.
At the trial, the general counsel has the bur­
den of proving that the Act has been violated 
as alleged in the complaint. An attorney from 
the regional office representing the general 
counsel tries the case. The charging party is not 
required to have its own attorney, although it is 
permitted to have one at its own expense. Even 
if the charging party has an attorney, the gen­
eral counsel’s attorney has the primary respon­
sibility for trying the case, and controls the legal 
theory for establishing the alleged violation. 
The charging party’s attorney can, however, 
give valuable assistance to the Board’s attorney 
because of familiarity with the case. At trial, the 
charged party, termed the respondent, is enti­
tled to an attorney at its own cost.
There is one important difference between 
the role of an ALJ and a federal judge. District 
court judges enter binding decisions that can 
be appealed. However, an administrative law 
judge simply makes a recommended decision 
and order for the Board. This decision is not 
binding unless approved by the Board.
The ALJ’s decision contains recommended 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to 
whether the facts constitute a violation of the 
Act. If the ALJ finds a violation, the ALJ issues 
a recommended order listing the actions the re­
spondent must undertake to cure the effects of 
its unlawful actions, such as requiring back pay 
for a discharged employee. Either the charging 
party, the general counsel, or the respondent 
has an absolute right to appeal the ALJ’s de­
cision to the Board. The Board then makes a 
binding decision.
A party files an appeal of the ALJ’s decision 
by filing “exceptions” to the ALJ’s decision. This 
is a formal document listing the alleged errors
the ALJ made in factual conclusions, legal 
conclusions, or in the proposed remedy. Briefs 
and counterbriefs are filed. The Board makes 
the final decision and order based on the tran­
script of the hearing, the exhibits, and the briefs. 
There is not another full trial before the Board. 
In some cases of unique importance or interest, 
such as raising an issue the Board has not pre­
viously considered, the Board may permit other 
parties (e.g. the AFL-CIO or the United States 
Chamber of Commerce) to file “amicus” briefs 
on the issue in dispute or even publish an order 
inviting interested parties to submit a brief. In 
rare cases, the Board may hold oral argument 
in a case. This may occur only one or two times 
a year; there are many years without any oral 
arguments at all. The Board’s decision is a bind­
ing, enforceable order. The Board may remedy 
the violation alleged in the complaint or other 
violations reasonably related to those specified in 
the complaint if the issue was closely connected 
to the subject matter of the complaint and was 
fully litigated in the trial. Also, in certain lim­
ited case categories, the rules authorize an ALJ 
to issue a “bench decision,” subject to appeal to 
the Board, on the record within 72 hours of the 
close of the trial without all the formalities of a 
full written decision.
5. Appeal Procedures
After the Board’s decision, the case can be ap­
pealed to a United States Court of Appeals. 
Figure 1.4 illustrates the enforcement process. 
There are 11 courts of appeals, each serving 
an appellate circuit composed of a number of 
states, and one appellate court for the District 
of Columbia. The party losing before the Board 
can appeal the decision to the court of appeals 
covering the state where the alleged unfair 
labor practice occurred, where the appealing 
party resides or transacts business, or in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia.
On the other hand, the respondent can sim­
ply refuse to obey the Board’s decision. In that 
case, the general counsel can file a petition in 
the appropriate court of appeals to enforce the 
Board’s decision.
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Figure 1.4 NLRB order enforcement chart
There is no new trial before the court of ap­
peals. The court bases its decision on the tran­
script and exhibits of the hearing before the 
ALJ and the Board’s decision. The Supreme 
Court has held that a court of appeals must 
uphold the Board’s decision if it is based on 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 
This means that if there is substantial evidence 
to support the Board’s decision, the court of ap­
peals cannot reverse the Board even though the 
court might have reached a different conclusion 
on the same evidence. This standard is applied 
because in establishing the NLRB, Congress 
intended the Board, not the courts, to be the 
primary agency to interpret and apply the Act.
The court of appeals can enforce the Board’s 
decision and order in full, modify the Board’s 
decision in some aspect and enforce the deci­
sion as modified, or vacate the Board’s entire
decision. Sometimes the court may remand a 
case to the Board for reconsideration in light of 
some point raised by the court of appeals that 
the court feels the Board should consider before 
further action is taken. Only a relatively few 
cases reach the appellate level each year. Over­
all, most of the Board’s decisions are upheld 
either in full or in substantial part. Practically, 
there is little chance of reversing the Board on 
appeal if the only issue is one of fact, such as 
whether an employee was discharged for cause 
or for union activity. There is a greater likeli­
hood of success on appeal if the issue pertains 
to the law’s meaning. The substantial evidence 
rule discourages the courts from substituting 
their judgment for the Board’s on fact issues.
There is a unique relationship between the 
NLRB and the courts of appeals that is some­
times difficult for laypersons to understand.
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The Board is bound by only Supreme Court in­
terpretations. The Board is bound by a court of 
appeals decision in a particular case affirming, 
denying, modifying, or remanding the Board’s 
decision. However, the Board is not bound by 
any general interpretations of the Labor Man­
agement Relations Act that a court of appeals 
may make. Sometimes a particular court of ap­
peals’ interpretation will differ from the Board’s 
on a specific point. The Board may continue to 
issue decisions applying one view of the law 
that the court of appeals consistently reverses 
because the court has a different interpretation. 
Sometimes some courts of appeals may agree 
with the Board’s interpretation while other 
courts of appeals may not. This means that 
some courts of appeals will affirm the Board’s 
decision on a given point while other courts of 
appeals will refuse to enforce the Board’s deci­
sion on the same issue. That conflict may con­
tinue until such time as the Board changes its 
view, the courts of appeals finally reach agree­
ment with the Board, or the Supreme Court is­
sues a binding decision.
A party appealing a Board’s decision usu­
ally has a choice as to where to appeal; because 
courts of appeals may disagree with the Board 
or among themselves, a party may maneuver to 
file its appeal in a court of appeals that would 
interpret the law favorably. This is called forum 
shopping. Generally, the court of appeals in 
which an appeal is first filed has jurisdiction 
over the case. Sometimes parties engage in a 
“race to the courthouse,” attempting to file their 
respective appeals as quickly as possible in a 
court of appeals favorable to their position. Al­
though forum shopping or courthouse races do 
occur in important or unique cases, appeals in 
most cases are routinely filed in the court of ap­
peals where the unfair labor practice occurred.
Appeal to the Supreme Court Following a 
court of appeals decision, it is possible to appeal 
to the Supreme Court. In contrast to the court 
of appeals, which must consider every case ap­
pealed to it, the Supreme Court has discretion 
as to whether it will consider a case. The tech­
nical term for requesting the Supreme Court to
hear a case is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
(abbreviated Cert). A petition for Cert describes 
the basic facts of the case and the reasons why 
the Supreme Court should consider it. The pe­
tition is reviewed by the Court, and if at least 
four of the justices agree to hear the case, the 
petition is granted. The case is then placed on 
the Court’s appeal calendar. There is no trial 
before the Supreme Court; the appeal is based 
on the trial transcript, the Board’s and court of 
appeals’ decisions, and the parties’ briefs.
The Supreme Court usually does not hear 
a case just because the facts are complicated. 
Normally, the Supreme Court considers only 
a case involving a unique issue of law or if the 
courts of appeals have reached conflicting deci­
sions on the same issue and the Court wants to 
resolve the uncertainty that the conflict creates. 
Sometimes, however, an issue may be so contro­
versial that the Court will simply prefer not to 
consider the matter at that time until the ram­
ifications are clear. Denial of a Writ of Certio­
rari does not indicate that the Court agrees or 
disagrees with the lower court decision; it sim­
ply means that the Court, for whatever reason, 
chose not to hear that particular case.
Supreme Court action, either in denying a 
Writ of Certiorari or in affirming or reversing 
the decision of the court of appeals on the mer­
its, is the final step in the judicial process. O f 
course, sometimes the same case may be before 
a court of appeals or the Supreme Court more 
than once. A court of appeals, for example, may 
modify or remand a Board decision, and the 
case may come back to a court of appeals for a 
second time. Similarly, the Supreme Court may 
remand a case to the court of appeals for recon­
sideration in light of a principle stated by the 
Supreme Court. The decision on remand may 
be reappealed to the Supreme Court after the 
court of appeals issues its second opinion.
6. Compliance Proceedings
After an unfair labor practice charge is finally 
resolved, either by settlement, by a Board deci­
sion, or by a final appellate court decision, the 
case goes to the compliance stage. Each regional 
office has a compliance officer who ensures that
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the Board’s order or the terms of a settlement 
agreement are complied with. That includes 
making sure that required notices have been 
posted, that any back pay has been paid, or that 
any other actions required have been taken.
An unlawfully discharged employee is en­
titled to back pay based on the difference be­
tween what would have been earned and what 
was earned, on a quarterly basis, after discharge. 
Back pay is taxable. However, the Board has re­
cently ruled that if a lump-sum back pay award 
covers more than a one year period, and the pay­
ment results in an employee receiving credit for 
more income from his employer in a year than 
the employee would have otherwise received, the 
employer must compensate the employee for any 
additional tax the employee must pay as a result. 
Also, the employer must notify the Social Security 
Administration of the payment so that it is allo­
cated to the appropriate month for social security 
credit. If there is a disagreement on the amount of 
back pay under a Board decision that the parties 
cannot settle, the matter is resolved in a back pay 
specification hearing. The regional director issues 
a back pay specification alleging the amount of 
back pay the regional director has determined 
the employee should receive. The employer has 
the burden of proving that the amount claimed is 
erroneous and that a lesser amount is due. These 
cases usually involve issues such as whether the 
employee was actively looking for work while 
unemployed, as the law requires; or whether 
the employee would have been legitimately ter­
minated before the date the Board ordered the 
reinstatement (such as by a legitimate economic 
layoff), so that the back pay period should end 
prior to the date the Board ordered reinstatement. 
Back pay specification hearings follow the same 
procedures followed in an unfair labor practice 
case and are heard by an ALJ. There is again an 
absolute right to appeal the ALJ’s decision to the 
Board and ultimately to a court of appeals.
Usually, the compliance officer simply checks 
with the charging party about 60 days after the 
Board’s decision has been rendered or a case has 
been settled to make sure that the Board’s deci­
sion or settlement is being complied with. If so, 
the case is routinely closed. If a settlement is not 
being complied with, the settlement can be set 
aside and the case will be resumed as a formal
proceeding. If an employer fails to follow a Board 
decision, the matter can be appealed to a court of 
appeals by the Board. If there has been a court 
decision enforcing the Board’s award, and the 
respondent is not complying with the court de­
cision, the Board can request the court of appeals 
to find the respondent in contempt of court.
The Board decides whether or not a respon­
dent is complying with a Board order and what 
action to take if it is not. Suppose that an em­
ployer has been ordered to bargain in good faith 
with a union. The compliance officer will con­
tact the union about the employer’s compliance. 
If the union believes that the employer is not 
bargaining in good faith, the compliance officer 
will investigate the facts. The regional direc­
tor, acting for the general counsel, determines 
whether the employer is complying.
If the regional director decides that the em­
ployer is complying, notwithstanding the union’s 
assertion that it is not, what can the union do ? Can 
the union seek court enforcement or contempt of 
court if the employer is failing to comply? No, it 
is the general counsel’s decision; he or she controls 
the case. If the general counsel does not act, the 
union cannot go to court on its own. There have 
been cases involving flagrant employer violations, 
in which the general counsel has settled pending 
court actions over the union’s objection that the 
settlement was too lenient. The unions involved 
could protest, but they could not prevent the gen­
eral counsel from taking such action.
7. Unfair Labor Practice Processing Time
Subject to certain narrow exceptions discussed 
earlier in Part III-D-1, a charge has to be filed 
and served within 6 months of the unfair labor 
practice. As with other administrative or judi­
cial proceedings, processing a charge before the 
National Labor Relations Board takes substan­
tial time. Thus, in fiscal year 2013 the median 
time from the issuance of a complaint to the 
date of a hearing before an ALJ was 81 days. 
There were 84 days from the close of hearing to 
the issuance of the ALJ’s decision.12 Although
12 Source: Office of the Executive Secretary, National 
Labor Relations Board.
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there are no precise statistics, the Board may 
take close to a year to decide a case before it on 
appeal from an ALJ decision. The cases taking 
the longest are usually those that may involve 
a new legal issue or reconsideration of existing 
precedent, or those over which the Board mem­
bers themselves are divided. Such cases may be 
held by the Board for several years. If a case 
raises an issue that the Board is considering for 
the first time or that it is reconsidering, other 
cases raising the same issue may be held up for 
long periods while the Board decides the point.
If a case is appealed to a circuit court of ap­
peals, it takes close to a year (longer in some cir­
cuits) after the appeal is filed before the court’s 
decision is rendered. That time includes time 
for filing the Board’s case record with the ap­
pellate court, filing briefs, oral argument, and 
court consideration. The courts of appeals also, 
of course, have a backlog of cases to consider. 
If a case is appealed to the Supreme Court and 
the Court agrees to hear the case, it may take 
at least another year before the Court reaches 
a decision.
Thus, some NLRB cases may take nearly 
4 years to resolve: 2 years to process the case 
through the Board, a third year (or more) for an 
appellate court decision, and a fourth year if the 
case reaches the Supreme Court. Some employ­
ers may take advantage of this time span, even 
in a case they know lacks merit, in an effort to 
delay bargaining or otherwise circumvent em­
ployee rights. However, most cases do not go 
through this entire process. For example, in fis­
cal year 2012,13 there were 21,629 charges filed. 
The general counsel found merit in 36 percent 
of the charges. 1,314 complaints were issued. 
Ninety-one percent of the merit cases were set­
tled (before or after a complaint was issued). In 
fiscal year 2012, 72.7 percent of all unfair labor 
practice charges were resolved within 120 days 
of the charge and 83.8 percent of meritorious 
(prosecutable) charges were at the compliance 
stage within 365 days. All these statistics tend to 
be fairly consistent from year to year. The Board
13 The processing statistics cited in this and the next 
paragraph are taken from the National Labor Relations 
Board Performance and Accountability Report, 2012, for 
the 2012 fiscal year ending September 30, 2012. Please re­
view footnote 10.
issued only 277 decisions in unfair labor practice 
cases, some of which were not contested.
The success rate of the general counsel in 
prosecuting complaints before the Board is con­
sistently high. Thus in fiscal year 2012 the Re­
gional Offices won 91.1 percent of Board, ALJ 
ULP, and compliance decisions in whole or 
part. Although precise figures are not available, 
it is generally the case that only a small percent­
age of Board decisions reach the appellate court 
level, and that a substantial majority of these 
decisions are upheld by the courts of appeals in 
whole or in part.
The general counsel has adopted internal 
procedures and time guidelines for the regions 
to follow in processing unfair labor practice 
charges. For example, charges are divided into 
three categories with Category III (cases with 
“exceptional impact”) to receive the highest pri­
ority. Under the guidelines, Category III cases 
are to be initially resolved (dismissed, settled, 
or complaint issued) within 7 weeks; Category 
II (significant) cases within 9 weeks; and Cate­
gory I (important) cases within 12weeks. The 
regional offices are also making greater use of 
email and other electronic communications, 
telephone interviews and faxed transmission 
of evidence to expedite investigations. Because 
these guidelines are subject to change and their 
implementation varies between regions, persons 
filing a charge should check with the appro­
priate region as to the internal procedures and 
time guidelines it uses in processing charges.
E. Procedure in Representation Cases
The form filed to start a representation pro­
ceeding is a petition. The Board has a standard 
petition form for filing a charge that is used 
in all regional offices. A copy of the form is 
available in the regional offices and at www. 
nlrb.gov (home-what-we-do-resources (forms)). 
Figure 1.5 is a chart of the representation pro­
ceedings process. Just as unfair labor practice 
cases have a “C” letter designation, represen­
tation cases also have letter designations. A pe­
tition filed by a union to represent employees 
has the designation “RC.” Figure 1.5 shows 
the types of representation petitions and the
Figure 1.5 Representation election process chart
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designations used. Representation petitions use 
the same numbering system as used in unfair 
labor practice cases: the regional number, the 
letter code, and the case number. Represen­
tation cases are commonly referred to as “R” 
cases. As noted in chapter 2, Part F., of this text, 
the Board has considered changes to its rules to 
expedite the representation case handling pro­
cess; but the fundamental processes outlined in 
this chapter would remain basically the same.
1. Administrative Investigation—The "Showing 
of Interest”
Representation matters are governed by Section 9 
of the Act. A representation petition filed by a 
union must be supported by a “showing of in­
terest” that at least 30 percent of the employees 
in the proposed unit want an election. This rule 
prevents the Board from getting bogged down in 
elections that the union has no chance of winning. 
However, an incumbent union can satisfy the 
“showing of interest” requirement by submitting 
a recently expired collective bargaining agree­
ment, including a prehire agreement permitted 
in the construction industry (see chapter 4).
Usually a union showing of interest is made 
by authorization cards signed by 30 percent of 
the employees in the bargaining unit stating 
that they wish union representation. However, 
cards are not the only method that can be used. 
For example, employees can simply sign a peti­
tion circulated by the union. However, cards are 
undoubtedly the preferred method. In general, 
the Board requires that cards be dated when 
signed. However, if undated cards are submit­
ted, the Board may accept an affidavit attesting 
to the date the cards were signed. As a matter of 
good practice, cards should also be initialed by 
the person getting the signatures. In that way, if 
there is ever any question about the authentic­
ity of the card, a witness can verify it. Usually, 
a union submits its “showing of interest” (nor­
mally recognition cards) at the same time that 
it files the petition. However, the Board’s rules 
permit the showing of interest to be submitted 
within 48 hours after the petition was filed but 
not later than the last day on which the petition 
would be timely.
The Board makes an “administrative inves­
tigation” to determine whether the petition is 
supported by the 30 percent showing. Someone 
from the field office conducts the investigation, 
usually by verifying the number of cards against 
a payroll list submitted by the employer to the 
regional office. The Board has consistently held 
that the question of a “showing of interest” is an 
internal matter for the Board to resolve. That 
means that there is no hearing on the question 
of showing of interest. Rather, if showing of 
interest is disputed, either side may informally 
submit evidence on the question to the regional 
director for consideration.
Another union may intervene in a represen­
tation case proceeding and appear on the ballot 
if it has at least one valid representation card 
signed by a bargaining unit employee or if it is a 
party to a collective bargaining agreement pur­
portedly covering the proposed unit. However, 
to participate in the representation hearing (be­
yond appearing on the ballot), the union must 
have valid representation cards signed by at least 
10 percent of the employees in the proposed 
unit. To seek a change in the scope of the unit 
requested by the union that filed the original 
petition, the intervening union must have valid 
representation cards from 30 percent of the em­
ployees in the unit that it seeks to represent.
2. Consent Elections
If, after preliminary investigation, the regional 
director determines that the petition raises a 
question concerning representation (that the 
petition is properly supported by a “showing 
of interest” and that the Board appears to have 
jurisdiction as discussed above), a regional of­
fice staff member normally contacts the union 
and the employer to determine whether the 
parties can agree to the terms of an election. If 
so, the parties may enter into a consent election 
agreement that includes a description of the ap­
propriate unit, the employee classifications to 
be included and excluded, the time and place 
of the election, and the payroll eligibility date 
(the date by which a person must be employed 
in order to vote). These issues are discussed in 
detail in chapter 2.
